Post by Michael SOn Mon, 22 Jul 2024 22:55:35 -0400
Post by Arne VajhøjPost by Lawrence D'OliveiroThe original recommendation was to stick with AES-128, and not
bother with AES-192 or AES-256; as far as I know that hasn’t
changed.
People should use AES-256 today - not AES-128.
AES-128 is toast if/when they make a quantum computer with
enough qubits. AES-256 is good.
It does not sound right.
We can be sufficiently sure that quantum computer capable of breaking
AES128 in, say, less than 10 years of compute time is not going to be
built in the next 50 years.
"toast" was not a correct description.
Maybe "very thin margin" is more accurate.
Quantum computers and Grovers algorithm reduce complexity from
n bit to n/2 bit.
So AES-256 change from 256 bit to 128 bit and AES-128 change from 128
bit to 64 bit.
64 bit is generally not considered secure.
But there is one important detail - Grovers algorithm is not
parallelizable.
Many experts consider 64 bit non-parallelizable to be god enough.
I don't know.
With classic computers then minimum is usually considered to
be 112 bit. If we assume that max. number of VCPU to allocate to
bruteforcing is 1 billion, then those 112 bit parallel is
parallel is equivalent to 82 bit non-parallel. Or the other
way around 64 bit non-parallel is 94 bit parallel.
Given the relative small cost of switching from AES-128 to AES-256,
then I can not recommend anyone to use AES-128.
I have no idea how quantum computers will evolved the next 5
years and definitely not the next 50 years.
But I believe in preparing for the worst.
Post by Michael SOn the other hand, there exist non-negligible chance that quantum
computer capable of breaking at least one of today's popular key
exchange algorithms will be built in next 20-25 years. And that would
affect all protocols that use broken key exchange regardless of
robustness of underlying symmetric cipher - AES256 would fair no better
than ancient DES.
If you believe in quantum threat, you should care first and foremost
about key exchange part of your solution. The symmetric part, assuming
that it's AES128 or better is safe.
The problem for asymmetric is much bigger. RSA, ECC etc. are definitely
toast when quantum computers become available with Shors algorithm.
But nothing one can do about it right now. The quantum secure
asymmetric algorithms are still in development. When they have
been approved/verified, then one should uset them.
And I will not ignore the AES-128 problem that has a very easy
solution today, just because there are other worse problems.
Arne